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EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION 
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISCUSSION ON TELEOLOGY: 
CURRENT POSITIONS 
One could easily come to the conclusion that since the quite 
animated discussion on functionality and teleology of the seven-
ties - taking place around Woodfield, Wright, Wimsatt a.o., and 
\.;hich tried to chart both the dimension of the description and 
the one of explanation - a new period of silence, or at least of 
weakened attention for these subjects, has set in. The develop-
ments in micro-biology, in molecular and cellular biology, in 
biochemistry, the developments in brain research, in the domain 
of computer-simulation, ... indeed convey the impression once 
again that the teleological description, and certainly the teleol-
ogical explanation, have become superfluous and can only be 
tolerated on economical grounds. 
Nevertheless it would be quite wrong to believe that the 
attention for the teleological problem has in the least diminished. 
When one looks beyond the different conceptual shifts, one 
discovers a wealth of investigations - of a theoretical-epistemo-
logical, practical or formal nature - which essentially have to do 
with this problem. 
It is precisely the epistemological approach, which we have 
brought to the fore in the present issue of Philosophica, which 
permits to discern a unifying element in this great diversity of 
investigations. It is therefore unavoidable that we should make 
explicit what we understand by teleology. 
We further indicate in which way this problem comes up for 
discussion in biology and in the domains where meaning plays a 
prominent part. Finally we give a short summary of each of the 
articles included in this issue. 
* 
* * 
One could think at first sight that teleology has to do with a 
representation or an idea which is connected with a goal that 
has to be achieved. Teleological behaviour would develop on the 
basis of a distance between what is and what has to be. Not 
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without reason did the cybernetics of the first order, for in-
stance, in its characterization of purposive behaviour, take the 
controlling function of the purpose as its starting point. 
Still, behind that epistemological denominator there is a lot 
more to be found. The purposiveness which is understood and 
explained on the basis of a goal conception, remains, because of 
the complexity of certain natural phenomena and systems, a kind 
of teleology that is too reductive and in fact almost negligible. 
Not only the development of a behaviour on the basis of a 
specific purpose, but also the development of so-called complex 
phenomena originating in less organized situations, where the 
purpose is not known in advance, has to be examined under the 
heading of teleology. In addition there is the resistance and the 
adaptation of complex systems to disorganizing factors, together 
with the anticipation of this sort of factors. And there are also 
the crucial problems of the development of meaning, of the 
development of higher levels of cognition out of lower perceptual 
levels, ... All these themes are at the center of the discussion on 
teleology. 
An abstract formulation of the problem permits to create 
some clarity in this apparently confused and divergent mUltipli-
city of data. 
We can posit that teleological phenomena confront us with the 
relation bet" .. een different levels: between the one of the parts -
the local level - and the one of the whole - the global level. 
Starting from such a minimal and abstract approach we can now 
formulate the teleological problem in a Kantian way: "How can we 
understand that in a system the parts mutually define each 
other and are defined in their turn by the whole, in spite of the 
fact that this whole precedes the parts at the same time in a 
certain way, and determines them in their form and content 
already before it exists as a whole?" 
The relation between the parts and the whole, as becomes 
clear in the presentation of the question above, has a paradoxi-
cal character. If we presuppose a determining effect from the 
global level before this global level exists, then the teleological 
character has a paradoxical status. The assumption of a deter-
mining effect from the future, the so-called reverse causality, 
has been the main reason ",,'hy teleological explanations were said 
to be metaphysical. 
We know that Kant, on the basis of what he calls the contin-
gent and rich diversity of the internally purposive forms, intro-
duced his philosophy of the 'as if'. '\-,1e must look at internally 
purposive forms 'as if' they were developed out of the concep-
tion of a purpose. 
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If to-day we still have to depart from this 'contingent and 
immense div.ersity', and whether we still have to understand the 
teleological question as widely as Kant, is highly debatable 
though. We shall not go into the discussion with Kant however. 
'1Je merely want to emphasize some new developments which are 
to be found in the present issue. 
For the time being it is at least clear that the discussion on 
teleology, both in biology and in other domains, is connected 
with reduction and emergence. The evolution within the domain 
of the means to experiment with the relation between local and 
global, both mathematically and artificially, has considerably 
heigh tened the attention for alternative and more refined con-
ceptions around emergence and reduction. The current connec-
tionism plays an essential part in this to-day. Seeing as it is 
closely connected with the analysis and the making operational 
of different conceptions of emergence. 
Several of the articles presented here try to develop new 
concepts, which are more refined than the former strong defini-
tions of reductionism, and than the metaphysical conception 
around emergence. 
The change that took place in the approach of teleology 
during the seventies, which we referred to at the beginning of 
this introduction, is certainly quite conspicuous. What it was 
about there was much more a study of the teleological explana-
tion, supported by the use of the term in every day language. 
We can say it was an approach of 'the second order', since it was 
a study of the formal aspects by which a teleological explanation 
(S does B in order to do G) can be distinguished from a tradi-
tional causal explanation. 
We think that this aspect is not to be found in this collection 
at all. 
Further we can also remark that the teleological problem, as 
it was conceptualized by Kant, has essentially to do with the 
aspect of form. The current morphodynamic approach appears -
because of the developments in connectionism, but particularly 
because of the morphological theory of Rene Thorn that was 
developed before already - to reconcile the philosophical tradi-
tion in a remarkable way with the current scientific tendencies. 
Finally, it remains for us to inquire into the nature of the 
general epistemological renewal of the theories under discussion 
here. What are the consequences of it for concepts such as 
explanation, truth, for the status of the empirical? What we have 
in mind here in particular is the new dimension which the notion 
of 'soft constraints' can introduce in the field of epistemology. 
With some of the authors in fact the peculiarity is to be 
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noticed that certain concepts have been removed. The most 
essential of these is certainly the one of control. In the place of 
this we encounter everywhere the idea that several local, soft 
constraints, the determining effect of each of which is not as 
such determinant for the result, 'vill lead to a global product. 
From an epistemological point of view we are confronted here 
with a conceptual gap: which alternative concepts other than 
those of sufficient ground and necessary condition will be 
adequate? An additional question, which mostly remains in the 
background, is the one of the explanatory value. Does the 
connection of explanation with the sufficient ground, through 
these soft constraints, not become impossible? Will the explana-
tion, as Isabelle Stengers poses it, have to be replaced by 
description? 
* 
* * 
We can see that the teleological debate is taking place nowadays 
predominantly within t.wo domains: the one of biology and the 
one with regards to meaning. 
That' the relation local/global within the domain of biology 
plays an important role, will come as no surprise. The relation, 
as it was described in its paradoxical form above, and which was 
recognized by some in the morphogenetic development, has given 
rise to the formulation of .vitalistic principles. This again led to a 
virulent opposition from the mechanistic views in science. 
It has become common practice in de last 30-40 years to 
employ the conceptuology of the self-organization to characterize 
this relation, even if the epistemological nucleus is rarely or 
ever explicitly brought up in this conte:A-t. The conceptual shifts 
do not imply that there is a lot more clarity in this domain. The 
discussion on teleology, however, becomes almost entirely a 
discussion around self-organization. The themes which are un-
derlying from an epistemological point of view, are still those of 
the reduction from a certain level to another, those of the 
emergence of properties on a higher level from local interactions 
on a lower level. 
The teleological problem does not only confront us, however, 
with the phenomena of the (biological) development of 'order' out 
of 'disorder'. It also faces us with the problem of the emergence 
of meaning. The relations between syntax and semantics, between 
perception and meaning, between perception and cognition, be-
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tween brain and mind are investigated here. Meaning is some-
times linked up with functionality on the macro-level, function-
ality which arises from the dynamic interactions on the micro-
level. 
A peculiarity is to be mentioned here though. Namely that the 
meaning, as an emerging product, is not only approached in 
analogy, but also in continuity with the teleology within the 
domain of biology and physics. The teleological problem, in its 
complexification from the biological order, thus leads to a com-
plexification of, and a closer relationship with, the problem of 
intentionality. 
It is precisely those two aspects which are being treated in 
this issue. For one thing we find here the elaboration, mainly 
from the morphodynamic side, of a theory of meaning which is 
explicitly brought in analogy with the critical phenomena out of 
physics and with the thermodynamic phase transitions. For 
another attention is being paid, and then mainly from the radical 
constructivistic side, to the development of meaning in conti-
nuity with the biological functionality. Both options do not 
exclude each other though. 
* 
* * 
We mentioned above that the teleology, as to its terminology, is 
to-day being examined mainly within the context of the so-called 
self-organizing phenomena. It has become almost infeasible not to 
think here of the diverse popularized interpretations which have 
engrafted themselves on some basical insights, through which 
extrapolations towards cosmical, moral, and other themes have 
known a wide diffusion. 
This issue of Philosophica does not aim at giving a survey of 
what to-day is going on in this fashion-determined movement. It 
does aim on the contrary at opening a perspective on some new 
theoretical insights which have to be situated beyond and above 
all fads and crazes. The articles can, as to this, speak each for 
themselves. The short presentation which we shall give here, in 
conclusion, of each of them, only serves to illustrate in which 
way the summarily indicated elements of the current discussion 
are to be found in them. 
The current radical constructivistic approach, which departs 
from the autopoietic theories of Maturana and Varela, is particu-
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larly successful in Germany. Ernst Von Glasersfeld, Gerard Roth 
and Helmut Schwegler are a few among the best known repre-
sentatives of it.l 
A recurrence to the first sources of the teleological discus-
sion - we are thinking of course of the final causes of ArisLotle -
should not be absent in a collection like this. Surely not if one 
knows that the attention for Aristotle is steadily growing in the 
so-called 'natural philosophy'.2 
The text from Ernst Von Glasersfeld, "'Teleology and the Concepts 
of Causation", situates the share of the Aristotelian doctrine of 
causality in the controversy around mechanism and teleology. 
These relations of causality are being examined with a view to a 
renewed making operable of certain aspects of the final causes 
in the scientific context. It is quite wrong to think that the final 
causes should only offer metaphysical prospects. The rigorous 
separation of mechanism and teleology is, therefore, untenable. 
That this belief continued to exist so long finds its origin in a 
conceptual confusion. It was rekindled in this century by the 
behavioristic aversion which again was merely interested in the 
concept of teleology. 
The historic-conceptual approach of Von Glasersfeld brought 
him to the examination of concepts such as cause, explanation, 
mechanism, induction, representation ... The analysis is being 
concretised on the basis of some well-known interpretations of 
the teleology, developed from a scientific point of view: espe-
cially those of cybernetics, but also the programmatic or 'tel-
eo nomic' interpretation in biology are being employed there. 
This article offers a wealth of clarifications in connection 
with the divergent uses of the teleological terminology. It also 
provides some insight in the deficiencies of cybernetics within 
the field of teleology, and describes the way to remedy these 
deficiencies. 
Gerard Roth and Helmut Schwegler are investigating in their 
article "Self-Drganization, Emergent Properties and the Unity of 
the World", the relation between emergentism and reductionism. 
They are dealing both with the relation between biology and 
physics, and with the one between mind and brain. Both the 
subtle conceptual refinements which they propose here - for 
instance the non-reductionist physicalism or the physicalist 
emergentism - and the way in which they conceive the central 
idea of radical constructivism - the properties of an object and 
the possible ways to interact with that object are defined on a 
mutual basis - is felt by us to be a genuine relief. It really 
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strikes a different note from the often too metaphysically held 
interpretation of emergence, and also from the often too meta-
phorical way in which the central idea of constructivism is 
interpreted. 
We can also read certain epistemological consequences of the 
constructivistic object-vision. For instance with regard to the 
untenability of certain positions: the 'traditional' emergentism 
becomes a truism, the reductionism an 'ex-post'reductionism. 
To us this way of proceeding by means of the questions: 
'What is rendered possible, as an epistemological position, by it?', 
'What on the other hand becomes untenable by it?', seems to 
provide a better view on the specific usefulness of the radical 
constructivism. 
In connection with that it would be worthwhile to apply the 
two kinds of criticism on the emergentism and the reductionism 
just mentioned, to the current connectionism. Precisely in that 
literature there are quite a lot of delusions with regard to 
emergentism, and, at the same time there is often a hidden 
ex-post reductionism. 
We applied to Isabelle Stengers for a text on the notion of 
'constraint'. For after having asked repeatedly for further ex-
planation during some of her lectures, there still hovered a 
promise around this concept which we never seemed to get a full 
explicitation of. 
The text that we publish here, "Comment se passer de 1a 
finalite?", is a critical analysis of the autopoietic theory of 
Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana, and at the same time a 
description of the confusions prevailing within the schools of 
thought which range under the denominator of self,.-organization. 
The concept of constraint, as opposed to the one of control, has 
a central place in her argumentation. 3 
Let us illustrate this by the distinction between the phys-
icochemical self-organization (dissipative structures) and the 
reflexive self-organization of the constructivism. Except for the 
very simple confusion between those two, there also exists a 
confusion with regard to the importance they can have within 
the field of finality. 
There is for instance the mistaken supposition that the first 
systems have to be brought in relation with finality. In a way 
this supposition is even less justified than it is in the classical 
thermodynamic systems, since the dissipative structures cannot 
even be characterized by a potential. The physico-chemical self-
organization will rather lead us to the question of the presuppo-
sitions which we associate with the identification of a system. It 
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will also lead UB to the inquiry into the conditions under which a 
preexistence of a purpo~e can be assumed. 
Isabelle Stengers proposes to t.ie up finality, repetition and 
the reference of the parts to the whole and with each other. The 
problems in connection with finality always presuppose a certain 
temporality, a temporality which is absent in physical chemistry. 
've may call it the temporality of repetition. It refers to a 
relative identity of a system which is maintained by the repeti-
tion. Here we can see that a.o. Bergson, but also Darwinian 
interpretations are followed, which increasingly give to terms 
such as adaptation and optimalization a purely retrospective and 
circumstantial meaning. This goes against the theories of Varela 
and Maturana, who define life in terms of the relation between 
the parts with regard to the whole. 
The most radical critique on the 'constructivist' of Maturana 
and Varela has to do though with the fact that two registers are 
played on. 
Either the central concept, the autopoiesis, refers to the 
actual means to describe and understand the living, which is 
considered on the basis of its specific identity. This option has 
to do with the experimental side of the concept. Within that 
option the aspect of becoming can no longer be taken into 
account. When there is question of becoming, of learning, then 
the specific identity ha~ only the statute of a 'constraint', which 
has no explanatory power whatever. 
Or the autopoietic interpretation refers to a general meta-
biological point of view. There the distinction between the spe-
cific repetitive identity and becoming disappears. It is posited 
that any behaviour whatsoever must correspond to the auto-
poietic organization, otherwise the laUer will disintegrate. Every 
possibility of direct knowledge disappears from that moment 
onward. 
This text makes us acquainted with a way of interpreting the 
concept of 'constraint' epistemologically. In the case of the 
dissipative structures the notion of control loses its pertinency. 
The development of a dissipative structure has to be conceived 
in terms of several soft constraints. It is susceptible to tiny 
changes in the 'circumstances'; it can go through a history. The 
constraints, that is, make it possible that in the process of which 
it is a necessary condition, certain circumstances get a meaning 
which did not exist yet before the process started. At the same 
time that constraint does also acquire a meaning for the system. 
The concept of constraint does not at all provide, according 
to St.engers, the premisses for an operation of deduction. It is 
still a necessary, but not a sufficient ground for what is being 
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produced. 
The discussion with regard to realism - is it possible to produce 
evidence of the existence of a mind-independent reality? - is for 
the most part implicitly present within the context of the study 
of teleological phenomena. This also remains the case where 
teleology is approached mainly by way of emergentist concepts. 
In what sort of way the two themes are tied up ,,-!fth biology, 
and particularly, under what conditions the question about the 
relation between a specific sensory state and a corresponding 
object is a teleological question, is being dealt with by Mohan 
f\fatthen in "Biological Reab"sm". The latter aspect is also to be 
found though under the heading of the 'naturalism'. As a conse-
quence we find here also an analysis of naturalism and realism, 
on the basis of the specific interpretation of the teleological 
relation. 
The current theories with regard to the perception of colour 
serve as a starting point in order to delineate, illustrate, and 
investigate those philosophical positions. 
The most interesting aspect of Matthen's interpretation is 
certainly the place that is given to the error, the mistake or the 
mis-representation.4 Neither by way of an evolutionary theory, 
nor by way of an idea of functional normality is it Possible to 
adequately calculate in the part played by error. Within the 
confines of a computational theory, which departs from the 
purposes of a specific perceptual process and considers the 
resul t as a more or less successful approximation of those, we 
can, on the contrary, duly account for the mistakes which occur 
in the relation between perception and external world. 
The question of realism cannot be decided upon within this 
theory in an aprioristic and non-globalizing way. Whether a 
mental state permits to know something about the external 
reality, has always to be decided upon on the basis of experi-
mental results. 
Francis Bailly intends to come in HLevels of organization, lev~el 
changes, finality" to an abstract, operational use of the concepts 
of emergence and complexity. Unseparably connected with this is 
the necessity to make the concept of level - and then in par-
ticular the fact that it is charact.erized by a certain autonomy -
more explicit. 
On the basis of an analysis in various disciplines the follow-
ing tvra minimal requisites for these concepts were postulated: on 
the OIle hand an intensive quantity of the sysLem in question has 
to be~ome· infinite; on the other hand this infinite limit must go 
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together with a change of what is called a pertinent object, both 
in the theoretical and in the empirical description. 
The concept of emergence possesses a stronger connotation 
than the one of complexity. Instead of referring, like the concept 
of complex.ity, to a critical transition of a regular state to 
another, we have to do here with a generalized criticity in the 
way the system is functioning. Bee:ause of this, the concept of 
emergence can better serve the purpose of characterizing tele-
ological phenomena in biology, the ones of which we have di-
scussed the problematical part-whole relation. 
Next to the greater rigour which this approach necessarily 
implies - it. frees the debate of all sorts of illusions - it also 
makes it possible to return with greater clarity to the central 
characteristics of what is traditionally connected with emergence 
and finality: discontinuity, critical transition, functional integra-
tion connected with a level of organization. The distinction 
between the physical level, the biological one, and the level of 
meaning, is again being confirmed quit.e clearly and conceptually 
sustained. 
Certain problems appear with all the more pregnancy: we are 
thinking here in particular of the way in which functionality is 
connected with t.he pertinency of a level, and of the relation, 
which is kept rather implicit, between the functionality of a 
biological organization and the origin of it, and also of the 
relation which the author is suggesting at the end, between an 
epistemological choice and a corresponding organizational level. 
This suggestion opens new and quite interesting perspectives 
for t.he function of abstract-formal investigations in science.s 
In another text of this issue, namely the one by Jean Petitot, the 
connectionism is explicitly inquired inio. In -rtThy connectionism is 
such a good thing? A cI'iticism of Fodor and Pylysh,"vn's criticism 
of Smolen sky" , Petitot takes up the already generally knov,rn 
debate between Smolensky and Fodor-pylyshyn. 
The introduction of the theme of teleology - which is here 
specifically concentrated on the emergence of higher cognitive 
structures from lower perceptual levels, or else, on the emer-
gence of language from its physical and neurophysiological bases 
- he readily takes as an occasion to point out one of the central 
weaknesses in Smolensky's argumentation. 
On t.he fact whether the sub-symbolic level has some cogni-
tive importance or not, there is quite a lot of disagreement. Have 
we only to do here with a new implementation, strongly sepa-
rated from the functional architecture - dixit Fodor and 
Pylyshyn - or is something more involved here? Smolensky is 
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only speaking about a 'semantic shift' in the transition to sub-
symbolic explanations. The epistemological development of the 
concept of emergence, on the basis of which he could have 
indicated the cognitive-structural importance of the sub-symbol-
ical level for the symbolic one, we do not find elaborated with 
him. 
Petitot's morphodynamic approach is showing both the weak-
nesses in the debate, as the different ways in which these 
shortcomings can be remedied. 
Instead of underestimating the part played by the emergence 
and thereby dismissing the connectionism on the basis of the 
argument that the sub-symbolic level can't say anything about 
constituent structure (as Fodor and Pylyshyn are doing), we 
must try to understand in which way syntactic-semantic forms 
emerge. We must, in other words, develop a dynamical structur-
alism, on the basis of mathematical theories about dynamical 
systems, which can be used to express that process of emer-
gence. Then it would probably appear that the sub-symbolic 
level is structural all right - even though no symbolic interpre-
tation is involved, still this structural aspect would invalidate 
the critiques of Fodor and Pylyshyn - and that the symbolic 
level is characterized in the structure by a certain autonomy. 
Petitot develops his ar gument on the basis of a radical 
criticism of the formalistic (logical-combinatory) approach of 
cognition and of the postulate of innatism connected with it. It is 
a criticism of which he has already shown the pertinency before 
in all sorts of domains.6 
In the article by Jan Van Dormael, "The emergence of analogy. 
Analogical reasoning as a constraint satisfaction process", the 
emergence of analogy is conceived as the result of an irrever-
sible, consequence-driven process whereby at the end the solu-
tion is being found. The formalization of an actual consequence-
driven process on the basis of the theory of counterfactuals, in 
which an a priory purpose is not to be found, does not only 
seem to us to be important on the level of logic, but offers 
prospects moreover for a less circular the6ry on the use of 
analogies. 
This article is, as we see it, the only one which takes up the 
'as if'-idea of Kant again. Perhaps not so astonishing, in view of 
the complexity, the 'contingent and rich diversity of forms' 
which is to be found within the domain of analogical thinking. 
Per hails it is also wrong on our part when we immediately, 
together with the 'as if', only think of Kant. The distinction 
between the fundamental complexity of certain phenomena and 
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the introduction of the regulative Idea does not seem to be 
noticeable here anywhere. The success of the analogical thinking 
even depends on the refusal to distinguish different sorts of 
reality, " .•. the lack of differentiating between planes of reality". 
That the justilication of the use of an analogy will become at 
the least problematic, ""rill. not come as a surprise to anybody who 
is familiar with the self-organizing theories. Andy Clark already 
remarked that these theories might very well prove to be opaque 
on the level of the explanation. "The observation of the growing 
of a banana tree is extremely interesting, but doesn't tell us 
anything about the internal structure and the way of function-
ing of it..."7 
Is there an irreconcilability between the ex post facto con-
struction and the justification, one could rightfully ask? 
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Editorial note: The original plan was to publish all papers 
mentioned in this introduction in a single issue. However, be-
cause of the length of some of the contributions, it seemed more 
appropriate to devote two issues to the theme of self-organiza-
tion and complexity. Thus, the reader should be warned that he 
will not find all articles discussed in the introduction in this 
issue. In addition, the next issue, volume 47, will contain one 
extra paper on this topic. 
